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25 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJ: UTR Activity - EE Program (with IPABR) Agent Status

1. On 12 September [ ] of EE came to DDB to inquire whether any of AEDFOT graduates had knowledge of the Polish or Czechoslovakian languages. He advised that EE Division was desirous of building up several small UTR teams of agents to be used in case of hot war or possibly for use in satellite uprisings. [ ] was advised that none of the AEDFOT graduates' records indicated knowledge of Czechoslovakian but that approximately 19 files reflected Polish language ranging from native fluency to poor. He was informed that these ratings were self evaluations on the part of the students and that this office had not tested the personnel in Polish. He was informed further that all of the AEDFOT graduates including these 19 were tentatively slated against existing hot war targets and that commitments had been made by the Agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the assignments of these men.

2. [ ] stressed the urgency of his proposed project and was informed that if a decision were made to utilize DDB assets against EE targets, a decision would have to be made on a DD/P level and be based on the relative priorities of the targets. As [ ] outlined his requirements it became obvious that he would need approximately 25 men whose training should include jump training, air operations, mapping and compass, survival, small arms, intensive observation and reporting and communications. Although the specific requirements are not known to DDB, it would appear the training [ ] was describing would constitute the minimum required for the agents.

[ ] indicated that EE was working under a tight time schedule and expected to have the agents ready no later than 15 December 1961. He was advised that the time element could well prevent him from reaching his goal due to the standard time required for obtaining FOIA's, contacting and recruiting new personnel, performing individual assessments, obtaining CIA's and conducting the necessary training within this relatively short period.

3. It was recommended that [ ] contact UTR for possible assistance with regard to both training sites and instructors. He was informed that DDB could assist the effort by the possible use of training sites, and instructor personnel after 19 November upon graduation of the current AEDFOT class. He was told further that DDB would be glad to assist EE Division in the recruitment program by either giving his recruiters pointers or having DDB personnel assist in the recruitment, or a combination

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of the two. On the surface it appeared [ ] had no complete training schedule in mind and it was felt that he did not appreciate the complicated problems involved in recruitment, assessment and training. He was informed that once EE Division made a determination as to what action and training would be followed, DOB would be glad to assist in any way possible. However, that EE would have to decide on the specific subjects to be taught and would have to realize that DOB instructors could not guarantee one hundred percent proficiency in any subjects because of the tight time schedule.

b. On 18 September [ ] returned with [ ] of EE for the purpose of reviewing the 201 files of the former ZINAGHTIE agents which EE had transferred to SR. The files were made available, however it was pointed out that the personnel concerned were a combination of Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian whereas he had indicated a need for Polish or Czechoslovakian. He was advised further that SR had reviewed the files carefully and felt the majority of personnel were unsuitable for further training as agents for one reason or another. [ ] did review the files but also reached the conclusion that the men were not suitable.

5. [ ] was advised that inasmuch as EE felt these ZINAGHTIE agents were unsuitable and since the SR assets were already committed, he should lose no time in obtaining leads which could be given FOA's and contacted for this project.

6. On 21 September [ ] called DOB asking for SR's views and requested [ ] consult with him the following morning. On 22 September [ ] met with [ ] and briefed him on the foregoing. [ ] advised that he and [ ] were going to investigate the use of Agency Personnel Office recruiters for this EE effort. [ ] arrived during the discussion and when many of the foregoing points were reiterated, commented on the fact that someone high in JM/P would have to take up the bureaucratic requirements and perhaps eliminate the polygraph testing, psychological testing, full OA's etc. He also talked in a positive vein about EE's use of some SR assets stating that Mr. Osborn had okayed this. Both [ ] stated that they felt Mr. Osborn's comments had been misunderstood and that we felt sure his offer of assistance was contingent upon JM/P making a determination of relative priority. [ ] then departed. [ ] and [ ] reported to [ ] in SR and advised him of what had transpired.

Based on the incomplete and uncertain knowledge of EE's aims, it was felt that the minimum time required for the obviously necessary training would be [ ] weeks after the personnel concerned had been recruited and were on board.

[ ]  
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

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